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GRASPING “THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER”
Commander James Kraska, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Over the past two decades international maritime law has evolved from a setof rules designed to avoid naval warfare, by keeping maritime powers
apart, toward a new global framework designed to facilitate maritime security
cooperation, by bringing naval forces together to collaborate toward achieving
common goals. The effects of this change are far-reaching—for the first time,
law is a force multiplier for pursuing shared responsibilities in the maritime do-
main. In a departure from the past hundred years of state practice, the contem-
porary focus of international maritime law now is constructive and prospective,
broadening partnerships for enhancing port security, as well as coastal and in-
shore safety, extending maritime domain awareness, and countering threats at
sea. In contrast, the predominant influence of law on sea power from the first
Hague conference in 1899, through two world wars, and continuing until the
end of the Cold War, was focused on developing naval arms-control regimes, re-
fining the laws of naval warfare, and prescribing con-
duct at sea to erect “firewalls” that separated opposing
fleets. The maritime treaties were designed to main-
tain the peace or prevent the expansion of war at sea
by controlling the types and numbers of warships and
their weapons systems and by reducing provocative or
risky behavior.
Today treaties do more than reduce friction and
build confidence: contemporary international mari-
time agreements spread safety and security through
networks or coalitions. Laws and international
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institutions have become catalysts for fostering coordination among states and
distributed maritime forces and spreading the rule of law at sea, and as a conse-
quence, the strategic, operational, and political “landscapes” of the oceans have
decisively changed.
The remainder of this article is divided broadly into four sections. First, it is
essential to describe briefly the major features of historical international mari-
time law, which traditionally focused on the law of naval warfare and naval
arms control. This survey extends from the beginning of the Hague Law, at the
turn of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth, to the Jackson
Hole Agreement between the superpowers at the end of the Cold War. Along
the way, high points in the terrain include the treaty system negotiated by the
five greatest naval powers at the Washington Conference in 1921–22, the naval
arms-limitations agreements that were extended at the London Naval Confer-
ence of 1930, and the several Cold War treaties, such as the Seabed Treaty and
the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement.1 The dean of this school of tradi-
tional international maritime law was the late New Zealand scholar D. P.
O’Connell, who published his influential The Influence of Law on Sea Power in
1975.2 O’Connell passed away in 1979, and since that time both international
maritime law and naval warfare have been transformed to reflect changing
patterns in the distribution of power within the world system and in the role of
naval forces. O’Connell delineated the function of international law in naval
planning by focusing largely on the law of naval warfare, and his seminal vol-
ume epitomizes the relationship between sea power and international law over
the previous century.
In the second section the article shifts toward an explanation of the relation-
ship between law and sea power since the fall of the Berlin Wall and highlights
the primary characteristics of international maritime law today. In doing so, this
analysis fills a void by connecting the major legal initiatives for maritime secu-
rity to the prevailing world political system, just as O’Connell did for a very dif-
ferent world more than thirty years ago. Recently emerging maritime treaties
and partnerships have transformed international maritime law and thereby re-
configured the nature of sea power by creating agreements to unite collective ef-
forts to enhance global shipping and combat maritime piracy, terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics trafficking. These
new regimes presage an integrated and cooperative approach, and their develop-
ment over the past two decades has shaped the diplomatic space to such extent
that they now may be seen as collectively the principal impetus for the 2007 U.S.
maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.3 In that
sense, the new maritime strategy was not a revolutionary document but a lag-
ging indicator of the changes in the legal and policy frameworks evolving in the
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global maritime system, and to that extent the document merely leveraged the
emergence of new cooperative relationships. For the first time, international law
is serving as a force multiplier for sea power, promoting maritime security both
globally and regionally, by broadening maritime partnerships and developing
emerging norms.
Third, the article turns to offer a roadmap of the most important interna-
tional maritime security treaties, agreements, and partnerships. These treaties
and agreements include the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which
entered into force in 1994 and is the umbrella framework for international law
in the maritime domain, as well as such post-9/11 updates to older agreements
as the 1948 Convention on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
recent revisions to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. Further-
more, the authorities contained in the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and especially the 2005
protocols thereto, and even the applicability of enforcement action in the mari-
time domain under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter by the Security
Council, have all been expanded in recent years. These and other agreements are
creating a network of complementary and interlocking legal and policy authori-
ties that form the basis for the new maritime order.
Having placed these agreements and partnerships in an analytical context,
the article provides a brief description of some of the principal initiatives. The
depth of the new measures and the creation of the self-perpetuating legal and
policy networks that propel them mean law now plays a defining role with re-
spect to modern notions of sea power. International law is becoming just as im-
portant as—indeed more important than—aircraft carriers and submarines for
ensuring global maritime security, because it unites the international
community in pursuit of common goals.
Finally, the article concludes that because international maritime law has
risen in importance, the United States should adopt a more savvy approach to
maritime diplomacy. Competing narratives or contending visions of interna-
tional maritime law and contests with competitor states over how to shape the
future order of the oceans should move from relative obscurity to the front
burner. The aggressive Chinese “swarming” ship maneuvers against the military
survey vessel USNS Impeccable while it was operating in the East China Sea in
early March 2009 demonstrate how inextricably these issues are connected to di-
plomacy and national security. This will require national-level leadership from
the National Security Council to ensure that all agencies and departments are
aligned on these issues and strongly advocate legal and policy positions that
clearly prioritize American security interests over other U.S. interests in the
oceans, such as the preservation of the marine environment and climate change.
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The United States was the primary impetus for developing the new international
maritime law, but it remains to be seen whether it will be the most influential
country in the shaping of the future maritime order.
HISTORICAL INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW
Early maritime law was designed to ameliorate conflict at sea. Perhaps the first
law directly affecting sea power was the set of customary rules governing the
law of “prize”—that is, the capture of vessels in wartime. Prize arose under the
concept of neutrality and of neutral goods that are exempt from capture by a
belligerent anywhere on the high seas. The rule was recognized as early as 1164
and subsequently included in the Consolato de Mare, widely adopted by Medi-
terranean city-states in the High Middle Ages. Early prize law evolved continu-
ously throughout the early modern era, with its greatest prominence
stretching from the mid-fifteenth century to mid-nineteenth. In 1618, the
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius cogently set forth the natural-law doctrine of “free-
dom of the seas,” a concept that preserved access to the seas for all nations and
thereby fueled an explosion in international trade. Grotius’s law setting forth
the legal divisions of the oceans was validated in the mid-seventeenth century,
when the Bourbon and Hapsburg rivalry engulfed central Europe in the Thirty
Years’ War. The conflict was brought to a close with the peace of Westphalia in
1648. The Treaty of Westphalia was an epochal document, recognizing sover-
eignty over land areas under individual autonomous rulers and ushering in the
era of the modern nation-state. Whereas the complex treaty recognized that
states exercise complete authority over and are responsible for maintaining se-
curity inside their borders, it was manifest that no nation could exercise sover-
eignty over the oceans. For four hundred years, international law regarding
land areas was governed principally by the canon of state sovereignty reflected
in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, and the rules pertaining to the oceans derived
from the complementary doctrine of freedom of the seas.
In addition to promoting freedom of the seas, British and, later, American
governments championed international law and international institutions as
necessary for the foundation of an effective world system of stability and con-
flict avoidance. In doing so, “the United States and Great Britain looked at the
world in a different way than have most of the European countries,” writes
Walter Russell Mead. “The British Empire was, and the United States is, con-
cerned not just with the balance of power in one particular corner of the world
but with the evolution of what we today call ‘world order.’”4 Over the last two
hundred years the singular leadership roles of the United States and the United
Kingdom in advancing a security paradigm based on both sea power and inter-
national law have been critical for international security. In developing and
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maintaining the order, the United Kingdom and the United States have had, be-
tween them, outsized influence on the shape of maritime law and its effect on
war prevention, naval warfare, and grand strategy.
Law of Naval Warfare
By 1758, the Swiss lawyer and diplomat Emmerich de Vattel had expounded two
fundamental principles of the law of neutrality that had gained widespread ac-
ceptance: belligerents were obligated to respect the neutrality of states remain-
ing neutral, and a neutral state had a duty to remain impartial. In 1856, at the
end of the Crimean War, the plenipotentiaries adopted the nonbinding Declara-
tion Respecting Maritime Law, in conjunction with the Treaty of Peace.5 The
1856 declaration abolished the practice of privateering and provided that a neu-
tral flag covers enemy goods, except contraband that could support the war ef-
fort, and furthermore that neutral goods, except contraband, are exempt from
enemy capture.
Prize courts applied the doctrine of “continuous voyage” and “ultimate desti-
nation” to look beyond the stated destination of a vessel or goods to ascertain
whether the final destination was an enemy state. A proposal for an interna-
tional prize court, reduced to writing in the Convention of an International
Prize Court 1907 (Hague No. XII of 1907), never entered into force because it
did not secure any state ratification. In 1909, however, the Declaration of Lon-
don Concerning the Laws of Naval War adopted the doctrine of ultimate desti-
nation, which permitted capture of absolute contraband whether its route to an
ultimate destination in enemy territory was direct or indirect and circuitous,
through neutral state waters or ports.6 Aside from its rules of prize and capture,
the Declaration of London was the definitive code of naval warfare for its day. It
was observed by several nations during World War I, although the document
never entered into legal force.
The first Hague Peace Conference, which met in 1899, adopted the Conven-
tion for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention of 1864 (Hague III).7 The 1868 Additional Articles Relating to the
Condition of Wounded in War provided protections for certain categories of
persons at sea.8 The second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 adopted seven trea-
ties relating to naval operations, which include the Convention (No. VI) Relat-
ing to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities; the
Convention (No. VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-
ships; the Convention (No. VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines;9 the Convention (No. IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval
Forces in Time of War; the Convention (No. X) for the Adaptation to Maritime
Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention;10 the Convention (No. XI)
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on Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War;
and the Convention (No. XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Case of Maritime War. This corpus of Hague law was complemented
by the Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality, which codified the
rules applicable to the relations between parties to a conflict and provided that
neutral states should be governed by the law of peace, not war.11 For example, ar-
ticle 2 reduced to writing the customary law permitting belligerent states to in-
tervene in neutral waters against another party to the conflict if the neutral
coastal state either allowed or tolerated the misuse of its territorial sea.
For most of this period, international law influenced naval power through
normative restraints on methods and means of warfare, such as proscribing un-
restricted antisubmarine warfare during World Wars I and II and shaping naval
force structures through ceilings on warship type and tonnage. At sea this meant
controlling the application of force in interstate conflict throughout the
oceans—by, for example, rules governing naval bombardment and mine war-
fare—and calibrating the exercise of naval self-defense. Customary interna-
tional law and the 1936 London Protocol prohibited destruction of enemy mer-
chant vessels unless the passengers and crew were first disembarked and their
safety assured.12 This rule did not apply if the merchant vessel resisted the bellig-
erent’s right of visit and search to determine the enemy character of the vessel.
During World War II, however, both the Axis and the Allies routinely disre-
garded this rule and intentionally targeted the merchant ships of the enemy, in
campaigns of unrestricted submarine warfare.
Finally, the Second Geneva Convention of 1949 restated customary rules for
international humanitarian law applicable to international armed conflict at
sea.13 The humanitarian principles of common article 3 prescribe rules pertain-
ing to the treatment of surrendered, wounded, and shipwrecked sailors.
Law of Naval Arms Control
While the law of armed conflict sought to reduce the effects of war upon those
placed out of combat, the law of naval arms control sought to restrict the devel-
opment of ever-greater instruments of war at sea. During the period between
the two world wars, the Washington Treaty of 1922 fixed battleship ratios for all
the major maritime powers.14 Following the abrogation of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles by Germany in 1935, Germany and the United Kingdom concluded the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement, limiting the German navy to 35 percent of the
Royal Navy and requiring Germany to conform to the rules of the Washington
Treaty.15 Despite cheating among some of the parties, the agreement actually did
slow the construction and size of capital warships. Perversely, however, the pact
also provided incentives for states to redirect naval ambitions into other systems,
such as submarines, that were not explicitly controlled.
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During the Cold War, Western security ultimately was dependent upon
strategic deterrence. The primary function of international law was to prevent
superpower conflict, in particular to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. In
that setting, international law took the form of nuclear and conventional
arms-control regimes, which were important parts of the broader equation of
managing superpower competition. The 1971 Seabed Treaty, for example,
slowed the spread of nuclear weapons by banning their emplacement on the
floor of the ocean beyond twelve nautical miles from the coastline. Similarly,
the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water sought to stop the introduction of nuclear capabilities
into new areas of the global commons. One of the few agreements that repre-
sented a departure from the law of naval war and the naval arms-control para-
digm was an August 1944 agreement, Coordinated Control of Merchant
Shipping, in which the Allied powers agreed to pool and cooperatively manage
shipping resources under their jurisdiction as the war was winding down in
K R A S K A 1 1 9
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Europe and the Far East.16 Law also served a channeling function to guide be-
havior toward less confrontational conduct, as illustrated by the INCSEA agree-
ment of 1972, designed to avoid an unintended conflict between American and
Soviet naval forces.
Today, in contrast to the past “build-out” in the law of naval warfare and naval
arms control, the new international maritime law is inclusive rather than exclu-
sive, inviting any country to cooperate; it is progressive rather than conservative,
seeking to promote and integrate international maritime networks rather than
capture and restrict the activities of the major maritime states. Made possible by
the end of the Cold War, the new international maritime law experienced its
greatest growth in response to global cargo-chain security and maritime home-
land security after the attacks of 9/11.
THE CONTEMPORARY ERA
International law has experienced dramatic growth and change since the 1970s,
both becoming more diffuse and exerting a more powerful influence on the
world system than in previous time. Over the past twenty years, seismic changes
in the world system—the collapse of the Soviet Union and the terrorist attacks
of 9/11—have caused international law to evolve quickly in order to accommo-
date, and even influence, the shape of the international system. In contrast, be-
cause it takes years to design and construct modern warships and aircraft, and
since those platforms remain in service for decades, naval force structure and
doctrine progress more slowly. So it is that in recent decades naval power and na-
val theory have lagged as indicators of change in the nature of power in the inter-
national system, but international law has been at the vanguard, driving those
changes. For instance, these legal trends predated and catalyzed the conceptual-
ization of the Cooperative Strategy, the legal and policy networks created arising
in new forms of international law influenced naval strategy, rather than the
other way around. The release of the Cooperative Strategy in 2007 reflected a
shift in theoretical approach to sea power away from the concept of command of
the sea, the linchpin of geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, and toward the no-
tion of constabulary sea control, which was promoted by British historian Sir
Julian S. Corbett. Mahan envisioned naval forces taking command of the seas
through large-scale engagements between battle fleets. For Corbett, however,
naval force structure should include not only ships of the line with focused com-
bat power but globally distributed engagement forces, such as frigates, that are
capable of exercising control of the seas.
“Sea power” encompasses both naval power and maritime power. Naval
power combines strategy and doctrine with warships and aircraft in order to de-
ter maritime threats, win war at sea, and project power ashore. The more
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inclusive concept of “maritime power” applies all components of diplomatic, in-
formational, military, and economic aspects of national power in the maritime
domain. The expanded notion of sea power as against purely naval power is de-
pendent upon the regimes created by progressive maritime law. The primary
beneficiaries of this phenomenon in the United States are the Coast Guard and
Marine Corps, which share a history of maritime constabulary opera-
tions—positioned at the seam between peace and war and embracing the geo-
graphic dimensions of land and sea. In contrast, for decades the Navy
marginalized amphibious warfare; only in the last decade has this mind-set
changed. It is no coincidence, however, that while the Coast Guard and Marine
Corps have become more relevant, the Navy still struggles to find its place
amid a network of new regimes that enable coalition maritime constabulary
operations and the building of maritime security capacity and partnership.
The Cooperative Strategy of 2007 attempts to serve as a framework to fill this
void, but problems of adapting to the new approach persist. Four years after in-
troducing the “thousand-ship navy” concept and a year after soliciting inputs
from American embassy posts, the Pentagon still has yet to implement its vi-
sion for the Global Maritime Partnership.17 Furthermore, the new legal net-
works and partnerships that facilitate maritime coalitions should have been
central to the Cooperative Strategy; instead, the document barely mentions in-
ternational law, obliquely noting that “theater security cooperation” requires,
among other things, “regional frameworks for improving maritime gover-
nance, and cooperation in enforcing the rule of law,” at sea.18 Although the
strategy correctly suggests that “trust and cooperation cannot be surged,” it
fails to promote America’s great strength in broadening the rule of law in the
oceans. The lack of a specific reference to the global network of international
laws that implicitly underlie the Cooperative Strategy represents a missed op-
portunity to play to the core U.S. strength, focus the purpose and goals of na-
tional maritime security, and reassure states skeptical of American intentions.
The emerging global maritime security regime is inclusive, multilateral, and
consensual. In contrast to the disparate and competing national perspectives on
international law concerning the initiation of war and the conduct of armed
conflict (in Iraq beginning in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006, and in Georgia in 2008),
there is great accord on the legal framework necessary for ensuring maritime se-
curity. Since the United States was the principal sponsor of the international sys-
tem developed in the wake of World War II, the evolution of sea power as an
outgrowth of international maritime law plays to a unique American strength.
The trend converts traditional competition arising from naval power—a “strug-
gle for power”—to a contest to interpret and shape the legal regimes of the
global maritime partnership—a “struggle for law.”
K R A S K A 1 2 1
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The United States has become the world’s leader in advancing these positive
relationships, which include such nonbinding political arrangements as the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Department of Energy’s megaports
initiative (to detect radioactive sources inbound to the United States from for-
eign ports), and the Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security
Initiative (CSI), which seeks to screen, though not necessarily inspect, every
container entering the country. The United States has also been a principal pro-
ponent and organizer of multilateral binding legal instruments, including UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004, which requires states to enforce effec-
tive measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
as well as several post-9/11 updates to important treaties under the rubric of the
IMO.
THE EMERGING FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME SECURITY
This narrative on the importance of international law at sea is at odds with much
of the conventional wisdom that characterizes the oceans as an ungoverned legal
vacuum.19 The global order of the oceans springs from the architecture of the in-
ternational law of the sea and of the IMO, and the new maritime security re-
gimes fall within those frameworks. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was
the first—and remains the foremost—international instrument for realizing
collaborative approaches to maritime security. Attempts in 1930, 1958, and 1960
at developing a widely accepted multilateral framework on oceans law had either
ended in utter failure or achieved only modest gains. In contrast, UNCLOS con-
tributes directly to international peace and security, by replacing abundant con-
flicting maritime claims with universally agreed limits on coastal-state
sovereignty and jurisdiction. The treaty is anchored in a set of navigational re-
gimes that establish common expectations, delineating the rights and duties of
flag, port, and coastal states. Even though some state parties occasionally pro-
pose rules that evidence unorthodox misreadings of the convention—such as
China’s bogus security claims in the East China and Yellow seas—UNCLOS has
served as a stabilizing force, a framework that protects and promotes the princi-
pal American interest in freedom of the seas. In doing so the multilateral agree-
ment, which now has more than 155 state parties, picked the international
community out of what D. P. O’Connell once described as an “intellectual mo-
rass” in which competing opinions and views served as a substitute for law. As a
result, the number of controversies in the oceans has declined.20
UNCLOS contains provisions relating specifically to maritime security. Arti-
cle 99 pertains to trafficking in human slaves, articles 100–107 address piracy,
and article 111 contains provisions for hot pursuit from the high seas into a
coastal state’s territorial sea. The convention also provides for the control of the
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illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, in article 108, international maritime drug traf-
ficking having become more prevalent during the decade of the treaty’s negotia-
tion. Article 110 incorporates the customary norm in international law that
warships may exercise the right of “approach and visit” of merchant vessels. The
convention permits a right of visit or boarding on the high seas by warships of all
nations, even without the consent of the flag state, for the purpose of disrupting
certain universal crimes, such as human slave trafficking.21 Whereas the right of
visit and search in the law of naval warfare has largely become an anachronism,
the right of approach and visit is employed on a daily basis in maritime security
operations.
The IMO, as a specialized agency of the UN recognized in the law of the sea
as the “competent international organization” for the setting of worldwide
shipping standards and approval of coastal-state regulations affecting interna-
tional shipping, is the key institution for the development of international
maritime law. With 167 state parties, the organization is consensus oriented
and broadly inclusive. Since its inception under the 1948 Convention on the
Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the organization
has proved remarkably effective in promoting safe, clean, and efficient ship-
ping. There is a refreshing absence of the political posturing that too fre-
quently marks the proceedings of some other UN agencies. The IMO member
states have adopted nearly fifty treaties and hundreds of codes, guidelines, and
recommendations that address nearly all aspects of shipping. These regimes
are now applicable to almost 100 percent of global tonnage.22
Global Cargo-Chain Security
Given especially the increasing reliance on “just in time” delivery, countries have
become closely bound together by maritime shipping; more than 90 percent of
global trade is conducted over the sea-lanes. Ensuring maritime security re-
quires a concerted effort among littoral and coastal states, landlocked and port
states, and especially flag states, working in conjunction with international orga-
nizations and the maritime industry. Nearly every maritime security scenario
involves multiple states and stakeholders—all with an interest in collaborative
decision making. A vessel hijacked by pirates or engaged in smuggling most
likely is registered in one nation (such as Greece), owned by a corporation lo-
cated in another nation (perhaps South Korea), and operated by a crew
comprising nationals of several additional countries (say, the Philippines or Pa-
kistan). Furthermore, the vessel may well be transporting either containerized
cargo or bulk commodities owned by companies in one or more additional
states, like Singapore. Finally, port officials or naval forces from several nations
may become involved in intercepting the ship, and each is likely to operate
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within its own rules of law enforcement and the use of force. Consequently, in-
ternational law constitutes the “language and logic” for facilitating cooperation
among these stakeholders.23
Specifically, the 1974 SOLAS Convention is the cornerstone for cooperation
regarding merchant fleet security. The treaty applies to 98 percent of world ship-
ping, and it reflects comprehensive safety standards for construction, design,
equipment, and manning of vessels. Ship subdivision and stability, fire protec-
tion, lifesaving appliances and arrangements, radio communications, safety of
navigation, carriage of cargoes and dangerous goods, and safe management
practices are all part of the package. In 2002, in the wake of the attacks of 9/11
the IMO convened a diplomatic conference to adopt amendments to Chapter XI
of SOLAS, called the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code. The ISPS
Code launched a worldwide public-private partnership for maritime security,
designed to enable national governments to develop better oversight of their
commercial shipping and port facility industries. The code contains mandatory
requirements for governments, port authorities, and shipping companies, as
well as a separate (nonmandatory) set of guidelines. In force for 158 states, ac-
counting for over 99 percent of the world’s merchant-fleet gross tonnage, the
ISPS Code provides a standardized framework for evaluating risk. By assisting
governments in synchronizing changes in the threat level with security mea-
sures, it reduces the vulnerability of assets and infrastructure.
Another set of SOLAS amendments has also enhanced the security of the
global cargo chain by bringing greater transparency to the maritime domain.
Using technology to pinpoint the location of merchant shipping, these amend-
ments provide commercial fleet, port, coastal-state, and flag-state authorities
with a greater level of “maritime domain awareness.” Situational awareness de-
pends on the ability to monitor activities so that trends can be identified and ir-
regularities distinguished. Data must be collected, fused, and analyzed;
computer data-integration and analysis algorithms can assist in handling the
disparate data streams. By understanding where legitimate shipping is located,
states can focus scarce resources on anomalous contacts and sort civil commerce
from suspicious activity.
Two systems for collecting and sharing information are attached to the
SOLAS Convention—the Automatic Identification System (AIS) and the
emerging, satellite-based Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) sys-
tem. AIS was originally designed in the 1990s to make transit through the Pan-
ama Canal safer. Vessels equipped with AIS continuously transmit size and
heading data; because of the signal’s limited range and the system’s open-access
architecture, however, AIS has substantial limitations. By way of developing a
next-generation approach to maritime situational awareness, in May 2006 the
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IMO adopted LRIT as an additional amendment to SOLAS Chapter V. More se-
cure than AIS and favored by the U.S. Coast Guard, LRIT is a global, satellite-
based vessel-identification system. When fully operational in 2009, LRIT will
make information on vessel location and identity available worldwide. Flag and
port states will be able to collect information on vessels flying their flags or
bound to their ports, and coastal states on vessels passing within a thousand
nautical miles of their coastlines. Vessels will transmit position reports periodi-
cally to cooperating national, regional, or international LRIT data centers. The
new system will be mandatory for ships three hundred gross tons or greater
making international voyages.
As early as 2002, Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, then Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, called for creation of a “maritime NORAD,” a maritime analogue of the
U.S. Federal Aviation Administration or an international Identification Friend
or Foe (IFF) signal, by which states would carefully plot and track every vessel.
After all, it was reasoned, ships are both slower and larger than aircraft; if aircraft
can be tracked in real time, why not vessels? But maritime situational awareness
is not an unmitigated public good. Both coastal states and rogue nonstate mari-
time groups, such as terrorists or pirates, could misuse data; coastal states could
use the information to impede the exercise of freedom of navigation and over-
flight; and international criminal organizations might employ it to attack or dis-
rupt shipping. In November 2008, for example, Somali pirates reportedly used
AIS to locate and hijack the thousand-foot-long supertanker Sirius Star, which
was passing 450 miles off the coast of Kenya.
Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation at Sea
Since the destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) was attacked in Yemen in 2000, remark-
able maritime terrorist incidents have included the attack on the French tanker
Limburg off the coast of Yemen in 2002 and the deadly bombing in the Philippines
of Superferry 14 in 2004 by the Abu Sayyaf group. These attacks and others illus-
trate the vulnerability in the maritime domain; in addition, the development of
new rules to counter terrorism and WMD proliferation at sea has been a center-
piece of the emerging international law of maritime security. Concern over the
threat of catastrophic terrorist attack from the sea galvanized efforts to strengthen
port and vessel security after 9/11. In no other area of international law have na-
tions so effectively and seamlessly combined elements of the law of armed conflict
and law enforcement into a unified approach.
One of the first efforts to develop new norms against proliferation of WMD
was the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Frustrated by the inability of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain to seize lawfully the MV So San in
December 2002, a group of nations collaborated to form PSI. The So San was
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permitted to continue into port to unload its dangerous consignment (Scud
missiles intended for North Korea), but the effect throughout the maritime se-
curity community was indelible—and work began immediately on a new initia-
tive to tighten nonproliferation rules.24
Speaking in Kraków, Poland, in May 2003, President George W. Bush un-
veiled PSI as a partnership activity to counter proliferation and trafficking of
WMD in accordance with international law and under the guidance of a set of
interdiction principles. Originally eleven core members launched the initia-
tive. More than ninety states have joined the informal network to work to-
gether in a more coordinated and effective manner, and PSI was endorsed by
the UN Secretary-General.25 Participants include some of the nations with the
largest shipping registries in the world, such as Panama, Liberia, and Malta.
Nine states have signed PSI ship-boarding agreements with the United
States.26 The agreements do not constitute authority by one state to board the
vessel of the other, but they offer a mechanism for expedited review of requests
to board, and some provide for presumed consent if a request is not denied by
the flag state within a few hours.
Only months after the initiative began, British and American intelligence ser-
vices discovered that the German-registered vessel BBC China was transporting
uranium-enrichment equipment from Malaysia to Libya, via Dubai. With the
consent of the German government the vessel was diverted to the Italian port of
Taranto, where Italian authorities searched the vessel and seized centrifuge ma-
terials, which were not listed on the cargo manifest. Two months later Libya an-
nounced that it was abandoning its ambition to develop a uranium-enrichment
capability.27 The BBC China interdiction has been followed by additional PSI
successes, conducted quietly to avoid attention.28 Efforts by Iran to procure
goods for its nuclear program have been disrupted, and a country in another re-
gion of the world has been prevented from receiving equipment for a ballistic-
missile program.29
In separate European regional initiatives, the European Union (EU) and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have taken action against the mari-
time terrorist threat. Following 9/11, NATO embarked on Operation ACTIVE
ENDEAVOUR (OAE) in October 2001, the only operation ever conducted by the or-
ganization under the mutual-defense clause of article 5 of the NATO charter.30
Under OAE naval forces have been patrolling the Mediterranean Sea, monitoring
shipping and conducting escort operations and boardings. Warships from Russia
and Ukraine also have participated. At the Thessaloníki European Council in June
2003, the EU began to establish effective policies for the disruption of interna-
tional shipments of WMD and related materials. In August 2004 the EU issued a
strategy against WMD proliferation.31 The cornerstone of the EU’s approach to
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combating WMD is effective multilateralism, which means that international
regimes should be able to detect violations and enforce prohibitions. The EU
also advocates strengthening the role of the UN Security Council as the final ar-
biter on the consequences of noncompliance.
Seven months after the introduction of PSI, the Security Council adopted a
historic resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to address terrorism
and the maritime transport of WMD. Unanimously adopted in April 2004, Res-
olution 1540 is binding on all nations under article 49 of the UN Charter. The
resolution asserts that proliferation of WMD to nonstate actors constitutes a
threat to international peace and security within the meaning of article 39 of the
UN Charter and promulgates new rules to address that threat.32 The resolution
calls on all states to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in WMD, of-
fering a foundation for counterproliferation law. That WMD proliferation poses
a threat to international peace and security was reiterated in Security Council
Resolution 1718, which was directed at North Korea following Pyongyang’s nu-
clear test of October 2006.33 The resolution also called upon all states to prevent
North Korea from obtaining material that would support its nuclear, WMD, or
missile programs, or even substantially replenishing the country’s stock of con-
ventional weaponry.
As a complement to Resolution 1540 and reflecting the philosophy of PSI, the
International Maritime Organization adopted in 2005 two major protocols that
collectively represent a breakthrough in maritime security cooperation. The
year after the 1985 hijacking by Palestinian terrorists of the Italian-flag cruise
ship Achille Lauro and the brutal murder of a disabled American passenger, Leon
Klinghoffer, Austria, Egypt, and Italy proposed that the IMO prepare a conven-
tion on crimes against the safety of maritime navigation. The goal was a compre-
hensive set of rules to ensure cooperation among states for the suppression of
unlawful acts at sea. The IMO promptly drafted a treaty, and in 1988 a confer-
ence in Rome adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).34 The prohibited acts include
seizing “control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intim-
idation” (article 3), acts of violence against persons on board ships, and the plac-
ing of devices on board a ship that are likely to destroy or damage it. The
convention obliges contracting governments either to extradite or prosecute
offenders.
Today 149 states are party to the SUA Convention, and these states represent
about 92 percent of the world’s merchant shipping tonnage. In 2005 a diplomatic
conference at the IMO adopted two protocols to the convention, one on strength-
ening the rules for the safety of vessels, the other on the safety of fixed platforms
on the continental shelf. The 2005 protocols add several new offenses, including
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attempts to intimidate a population or compel a government or an international
organization. Specifically, the 2005 protocols criminalize such perilous activities
as using any explosive, radioactive material, or a biological, chemical, or nuclear
weapon on or against a ship; knowingly transporting such material on a ship; or
operating a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage. The
protocols also prohibit the transport of “dual use” or source materials that might
find their way into chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
With PSI, Resolution 1540, and the amended SUA Convention, nations are
establishing a global, and increasingly effective, network of legal and policy au-
thorities to synchronize intelligence and operations against terrorists and WMD
in the maritime domain. Some believe the SUA protocols may end up eclipsing
PSI, notwithstanding the value of an interlocking network of formal and infor-
mal arrangements. First, the era of “coalitions of the willing” may be coming to a
close, the concept having been badly bruised by the experience of Iraq. For all
the groundbreaking (and frankly astonishing) successes of PSI, some countries
are wary of its informal nature and process. Second, shipping commerce is a
global industry, one that relies on a common framework of international con-
ventions and treaties; the industry can operate efficiently only when regulations
applicable to a particular ship are identical at the port of departure, on the high
seas, and at the port of arrival. Since PSI focuses on enlarging national authori-
ties rather than global rules, it is more likely to create inadvertently a web of in-
consistent national laws than is the standardized international legal regime of
SUA. The shipping industry is hopeful that the amended SUA 2005 will attract
widespread support and enter into force quickly.
Counterpiracy
Maritime piracy has returned as a major security issue only in the last decade. In
2008 maritime piracy doubled in the Horn of Africa, with Somali pirates hijack-
ing more than forty vessels and taking nearly nine hundred seafarers hostage. Pi-
ratical attacks in the Gulf of Aden expose civil shipping to dangers not
experienced since the Iran-Iraq “tanker war” of the 1980s. The law of the sea de-
fines maritime piracy as an illegal act of violence or detention committed for
private ends; on the high seas, anywhere else outside the jurisdiction of a state,
and in such ungoverned areas as Somalia’s territorial sea, any nation may take
action against piracy. Customary international law provides, in fact, that any na-
tion may assert jurisdiction over piracy, including the state of registry or flag
state of the attacked vessel, nations whose citizens are victims, and in some cases
coastal or port states.
In 1986 the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO adopted Circular 443
promulgating measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crew on
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board ships.35 The circular applied to passenger ships on voyages of twenty-four
hours or more and to port facilities that service those vessels. After a minor surge
in piracy in the early 1990s, the IMO released two circulars, 622 and 623, to
counter the threat.36 The first detailed recommendations to governments for
preventing and suppressing piracy, and the second offered guidance to the mari-
time commercial sector. In 1999 both circulars were revised.37 The revision to
Circular 622 sets forth investigative protocols for use after a pirate attack, as well
as a draft regional agreement on counterpiracy.38 The revised Circular 623 lists
measures by which the shipping industry can reduce vulnerability to piracy,
such as enhanced lighting and alarms.39 In 2008 Denmark proposed that both
circulars be reviewed and again updated in light of the recent attacks in the Horn
of Africa, and that review is under way.
In 2008, after prompting from Mr. Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, the Secretary-
General of the IMO, the Security Council took action against piracy in the Horn
of Africa by adopting four key resolutions under Chapter VII, authorizing “all
necessary means.” The resolutions enhance counterpiracy collaboration among
nations, strengthen operational capabilities, remove sanctuaries in Somalia, and
support criminal prosecution.
Resolution 1816 of 2 June allowed naval forces cooperating with the Transi-
tional Federal Government of Somalia to pursue pirates into Somalia’s ungov-
erned territorial waters. Resolution 1838, adopted in October, expressed
concern over the threat of piracy to World Food Program shipments to Somalia,
called upon states to deploy naval vessels and aircraft to the Gulf of Aden and
surrounding waters, and affirmed that UNCLOS embodies the rules applicable
to countering piracy. Resolution 1846 of 2 December 2008 suggested that the
1988 SUA Convention could be applied in the extradition and prosecution of pi-
rates. Two weeks later, Resolution 1851 authorized states to take action against
safe havens used by pirates ashore in Somalia (an authority likely to be imple-
mented only cautiously). It also invited states with maritime forces in the area
and regional states to conclude arrangements to embark local law-enforcement
officials on board their warships patrolling the area. Finally, Resolution 1851 en-
couraged formation of a multinational Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia. More than thirty countries and organizations, including the EU,
NATO, and the African Union, responded, forming working groups to develop
collective action for various aspects of the effort against Somali piracy.
Following the adoption of these four UN Security Council resolutions, the
United Kingdom and the United States signed counterpiracy cooperation agree-
ments with Kenya, and the United States made the first transfer of captured pi-
rate suspects to Kenya in March 2009.
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Based on language developed at an IMO meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
in April 2008, eight coastal states situated on the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and
the western Indian Ocean, plus Ethiopia, met in January 2009 and concluded the
Djibouti Code of Conduct to combat acts of piracy against ships. The agreement
is based on a sixteen-nation counterpiracy treaty known as the Regional Coop-
eration Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia (ReCAAP), which has been remarkably successful in reducing piracy at-
tacks in East Asia. Just as ReCAAP was the first Asian agreement dedicated to
counterpiracy, the Djibouti Code of Conduct is the first such regional agree-
ment between Arab and African countries, although the Djibouti accord is not
legally binding.
Counternarcotics
Decades before UNCLOS entered into force, states were negotiating in earnest to
counter maritime drug trafficking. These efforts represent windows into early
instances of effective collaboration in the maritime domain. Today,
internationally organized criminals operate illicit maritime networks for drug
trafficking, and the ocean is the preferred medium for moving multi-ton loads
from producers in the Andean Ridge and South Asia to black markets in Europe
and North America. Drug traffickers exploit related illicit networks to facilitate
additional crimes, including money laundering, transnational corruption, hu-
man trafficking, and terrorism.
Three widely accepted international treaties, which enjoy near-universal ac-
ceptance, call on states to cooperate in counterdrug activities and operations.
The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) has been in force since 1964
and has 180 state parties; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971)
entered into force in 1976 and has 175 state parties; and the UN Convention on
Illicit Traffic of Narcotics and Psychotropic Drugs (1988) has been in force since
1990, with 170 state parties. These treaties are mutually supportive and comple-
mentary. An important purpose of the first two was to codify internationally ap-
plicable control measures in order to ensure the availability of lawful narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes while
preventing their diversion into the black market. The third treaty regulates pre-
cursor chemicals used in manufacturing drugs controlled by the Single Conven-
tion and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and it also strengthens
provisions against money laundering and other drug-related crimes.
States often fulfill their obligations under the multilateral treaties through
bilateral or regional maritime counterdrug agreements. The United States has
negotiated twenty-six such bilateral agreements, mostly with Caribbean states.
Under these arrangements, states permit other nations to operate in waters
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62 [2009], No. 3, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss3/9
under their jurisdictions in accordance with preplanned actions or responses.
The agreements often define specific parameters, such as geographical areas,
time periods, frequency, or potential targets or suspects. Operational coopera-
tion may include exchange of information or cooperative patrolling or en-
forcement actions. Typically state parties prescribe procedures for designating
on-scene commanders and mutually acceptable rules of engagement for mari-
time counterdrug operations. States also may reach agreement on whether a
party may board vessels of another party, and if so, under what circumstances.
The agreements accelerate real-time decision making, allowing determina-
tions on boarding and seizure to be made more quickly.
NEW NOTIONS OF SEA POWER
Threats to maritime security flourish at the “seams” of globalization, where ju-
risdiction can be unclear and the inherent isolation of vessels and nations can be
exploited. International law has become the most effective tool for closing these
seams. The emerging international rules have had a transformative effect upon
how maritime security is thought about and implemented.
The new international maritime law increases coordination among con-
cerned partners and improves the readiness of all states to act effectively. The de-
velopment of the law is regional and global, bilateral and multilateral. The
sweeping nature of this development—in its application to all oceans, narrow
seas, and coastal areas; the depth of the measures for which it provides; and the
self-perpetuating nature of the legal and policy networks that propel them—has
given law a defining role with respect to notions of sea power. Collectively, the
initiatives described here have completely renovated international maritime law
and now presage a new, cooperative approach to sea power.
The widespread consensus throughout the world regarding maritime secu-
rity has been notably absent in other security contexts, such as the debate over
whether counterterrorism operations on land constitute law enforcement or
warfare. The principal manifestation of this dispute is the debate over whether
captured terrorists should be treated as criminals or some stripe of unlawful
combatant under the laws of war. The United States has been incapable of deal-
ing with the issue, dissatisfied with the ability of the criminal-law model to en-
sure security but uncomfortable with the application of the law of armed
conflict. Even the nation’s highest court has been unable to resolve the matter
clearly.40 Meanwhile, maritime international law has moved purposefully and
confidently toward a middle path, recognizing that though maritime law arises
in a peacetime framework it must be responsive to conventional, asymmetric,
and hybrid threats at sea. Informed by centuries of progress and shared
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experience in the struggle with piracy, maritime international law quite com-
fortably straddles the divide between criminal law and the law of war.
Many misunderstand the interface between international law and domestic
authorities. This intersection is the sphere of foreign-relations law, and it is the
critical bridge between international commitments and treaties and their im-
plementation by individual states. Most international agreements are not
self-executing; in the United States and many other countries, international ob-
ligations must be implemented by domestic legislation to be given effect. The
nuances of this interface have real consequences for naval forces. The fact that an
activity like piracy is a universal crime in customary international law does not
mean a state can take enforcement action if it has not criminalized piracy under
its domestic law. Foreign-relations law fuses sea power and maritime-security
operations to international legal regimes.
The U.S. Coast Guard has been much more sensitive to recognize and capital-
ize on this new state of affairs than the Navy, perhaps because it is simulta-
neously a law-enforcement agency and an armed force, and because it leads the
American delegation to the IMO. The Coast Guard takes a holistic “systems”
view of maritime governance, in terms of regimes, awareness, and operations;
the Navy’s approach to these issues is not as well developed. For example, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard has championed the SOLAS amendments that
will create the LRIT system; for their part, few naval officers are familiar with the
system, though it is the future of unclassified information sharing for maritime
domain awareness. Moreover, international maritime law is too often viewed
within the Navy through an outdated prism, particularly by officers who rose
during the Cold War. That is, the Navy tends to see international maritime law as
comprising the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (which reflects the core Ameri-
can interest in freedom of navigation) and the law of naval warfare (which has
enjoyed only sporadic relevance since World War II). The new treaties and part-
nerships are unfamiliar to many naval officers.
But this will change as these initiatives continue to reconfigure sea power it-
self. Consequently it is not surprising (but unfortunate) that the Cooperative
Strategy failed to promote international law of the sea as the organizing principle
and principal goal of U.S. maritime strategy. This glaring omission has been
noted by numerous friends and allies, who time and again reminded the United
States of the centrality of international law in their responses to the original
thousand-ship-navy concept. Writing separately, naval commanders from
France, Ghana, India, Portugal, and Spain all made reference to the importance
of international maritime law in their comments on the thousand-ship navy
published in 2006 by the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute.41 A year later,
many of the same chiefs of service were asked to respond to Admiral Michael G.
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Mullen’s plan for a new U.S. maritime strategy. Once again, international law
was a prominent feature of their replies; the leaders of the naval forces of Brazil,
Peru, Portugal, Colombia, Uruguay, Lebanon, and Spain urged the United States
to ensure that maritime security is rooted in multilateral legal frameworks.42 It is
especially important that the vigorous expansion of maritime partnership inte-
gration propelled by international law be maintained. The maritime domain
awareness provisions of the SOLAS Convention, the counterproliferation and
counterterrorism elements of the SUA 2005 protocols, and PSI, with its informal
nature, and Security Council action against piracy, constitute the greatest pack-
age of multilateral maritime-security commitments since the interwar period of
the 1930s. The United States led each of these efforts, but there is a widespread
perception that the American “brand” has suffered since and that the diplomatic
influence of its friends and allies in Europe has diminished.43 Meanwhile, that of
China and Russia is expanding. The upshot is a degree of doubt about the ability
of the West to shape the future direction of international maritime law toward a
shared vision of the rule of law at sea. This means that we should be prepared to
make even greater investments in cooperation, and the development of
international maritime law and institutions, to realize the goals of the Coopera-
tive Strategy.
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